中国国有商业银行激励机制:一个新的非线性激励契约  

Incentive Mechanism of China's State-Owned Commercial Banks: a New Non-Linear Incentive Contract

作　　者：刘华芳[1] 党兴华[1] 

机构地区：[1]西安理工大学工商管理学院

出　　处：《金融论坛》2005年第8期46-50,共5页Finance Forum

摘　　要：我国传统的银行管理人激励方法是根据银行最终实现的收益决定对管理人的奖励,一般是线性的。本文通过对这种线性激励契约的剖析,发现由于银行管理人的有限责任以及企业软约束的存在,银行的预期收益与风险水平呈倒U字的二次关系,因此线性激励契约只会使管理人过度冒险,而无益于银行的预期收益。因此,本文构建了修正的资本资产定价模型,并在此基础上提出了一个新的非线性激励契约:对管理人的奖励计划不再是连续的,而是提供一个有限的奖励范围以避免银行管理人的过度冒险;只有当银行管理人选择的风险水平不超过最优风险水平时,他才可以拿到与其努力水平相等的奖金。Traditionally, incentives to banking executives are based on the returns they have realized, which is in general a linear process. Through an analysis of such a linear incentive contract, it is found that due to the limited responsibility on banking executives and the existence of soft constraints by the organization, the envisaged banking returns and risk exposure are related to each other quadratically like an inverted letter U. As a result, a linear incentive contract can only encourage executives to take excessive risks at the expense of expected banking earnings. Therefore, a revised capital asset pricing model is established with a new non-linear incentive contract. Accordingly,instead of being consecutive, incentive program for executives, should be a limited range less they are over-adventurous. It is not until a banking executive opts for a lower risk level than the optimal risk level can he/she receive a bonus commensurate with his/her effort.

关 键 词：国有商业银行 非线性激励 修正的资本资产定价模型 线性激励契约 激励机制 资本资产定价模型 中国 风险水平 预期收益 有限责任 

分 类 号：F832.33[经济管理—金融学] F279.241