为什么中国上市公司的内部职工持股计划不成功  

The Study of ESOPs of Listed Firms in China

作　　者：王晋斌[1] 

机构地区：[1]中国人民大学经济学院,北京100872

出　　处：《金融研究》2005年第10期97-109,共13页Journal of Financial Research

基　　金：北京奥尔多投资研究中心<机构投资者行为>课题研究的部分成果。

摘　　要：通过构造一个利益相关者模型,本文从内部职工持股计划(ESOPs)参与主体出发讨论实施该计划中的三个关键问题:企业绩效、财富转移和利益协调。企业绩效、财富转移是实施ESOPs的两个重要动机。利益协调是这两个动机实现的约束条件。同时,本文构造了一个两阶段参与者感知——预期模型分析员工的治理权这一重要的利益协调机制。本文认为,动机与规则安排相冲突的制度设计使得中国上市公司的ESOPs最终成为一种短期员工福利计划,内部职工股份在相当短的时间内演变为公众持股形式,没有形成一种通过员工参与公司管理并创造公司合作型文化的长期组织形式。This paper focuses on three main questions in the ESOPs—performance of firm, wealth transfer and benefit coordination-based on a being constructed model of stakeholders. The performances of firm and wealth transfer are the important motives for the design of successful ESOPs, and the measures of benefit coordination can facilitate the achievement of these motives significantly. A Participation Model of Perception and Expectation is also built to explore benefit coordination meastaes-the employee＇s right to exercise governance of the firms. The conclusion is that the conflicts between the motives and related institutional arrangement make the ESOPs fail to become an extended form for the management the development of listed companies in China.

关 键 词：ESOPS 投资者选择权 感知——预期模型 

分 类 号：F276.6[经济管理—企业管理]