合作知识创新中资源共享决策的博弈分析  

Game Analysis of Resource Sharing Decisions in Collaborative Knowledge Creation

作　　者：王建宇[1] 樊治平[1] 

机构地区：[1]东北大学工商管理学院,辽宁沈阳110004

出　　处：《东北大学学报（自然科学版）》2005年第10期1017-1020,共4页Journal of Northeastern University(Natural Science)

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70371050);教育部高等学校优秀青年教师教学科研奖励计划资助项目(教人司[2002]123);辽宁省自然科学基金资助项目(20032028)

摘　　要：研究了合作知识创新中的跨组织资源共享及合作维系的条件.用博弈论的方法,把合作知识创新看作一个领导组织和多个从属组织的Stackelberg主从博弈.针对是否共享前期创新成果的两种情况,分别建立了两个场景下的不同模型,求出了相应的知识创新投入的均衡值、领导者的参与率、各跟随者的参与率以及创新的总体收益,并对两个场景进行了对比分析.指出只有领导组织的边际收益和各从属组织边际收益之和保持最优比,合作才可能形成并成功维系.The conditions on which the trans-organizational resources can be shared with collaboration kept on in collaborative knowledge creation is explored taking the game theory as a framework, the collaboration for knowledge creation is separately modeled as a Stackelberg leader-follower game, i. e. , a leading organization and several subsidiary ones. Two models are developed separately according to the two different ,scenarios-whether the leader and followers have both shared the previous creative achievements or not. Then the equilibrium values of relevant efforts made by both parties in knowledge creation, the participation rates of every party＇s resources, and the total expected gain from knowledge creation are determined in the two different scenarios with all values analyzed comparatively, It＇s found that the collaboration is possible to form and keep on successfully only if the ratio of marginal gain between the leading organization and its subsidiary ones can be optimized.

关 键 词：合作知识创新 资源共享 STACKELBERG博弈 成本收益分析 

分 类 号：F275.9[经济管理—企业管理]