上市公司股票增值权激励效果的实证研究  

Empirical Study of Incentive Effects of Stock Appreciation Rights of Listed Companies

作　　者：李曜[1] 管恩华[1] 

机构地区：[1]上海财经大学,上海200433

出　　处：《商业经济与管理》2005年第10期44-50,共7页Journal of Business Economics

基　　金：教育部人文社科基金"股权激励与公司价值增长关系的理论与实证研究"(01JA790093);国家社会科学基金"管理层收购后的中国上市公司治理绩效及其改进研究"(05CJL011)阶段研究成果

摘　　要：股票增值权是企业对管理层实施激励的重要做法,在我国大型国有控股境外上市公司中普遍采用。本文以中国石化为研究对象,对实施股票增值权计划后的公司财务绩效、治理机制与管理层代理成本、股票市场反应等作了实证检验。文章认为:股票增值权计划对公司财务绩效提升、治理机制改善具有一定的积极正面效应;股票增值权等待期结束后的开始行权年度,激励效果最大;股票市场对股票增值权的行权,存在着过度反应。最后本文提出了改进股票增值权激励的政策建议。The stock appreciation fights（SARs） is an important incentive plan for corporate executives and widely used in China＇ s stateowned overseas listed companies. Taking China Sinopec as the object, this paper makes an empirical test of the company＇ s financial performance, governance mechanism, management agency costs and stock market reflection after SARs plan is carried out. The paper finds that the company＇s financial performance and its governance mechanism are bettered partly for the use of SAR. The incentive effect is the largest at the first year of SAR＇ s exercise year. The stock market is overacted to the exercise of SAlt. At last the paper gives some policy suggestions for the improvement of SAR.

关 键 词：股票增值权 中国石化 激励效果 

分 类 号：F830.91[经济管理—金融学]