管理者时限问题的互惠解决方法  

Discussion on SRE between Firm and Its Executive in Last Period

作　　者：黄湛冰[1] 万迪昉[1] 

机构地区：[1]西安交通大学管理学院,陕西西安710049

出　　处：《系统工程》2005年第9期27-32,共6页Systems Engineering

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70371036);博士点基金资助项目(20020698043)

摘　　要：以行为博弈中的序贯互惠模型为基础对管理者的时限问题进行研究,并综合预期因素,通过对企业与其管理者间序贯互惠均衡的分析讨论,得出解决时限问题的五个方向:增加未来收益预期、重视过去合作的历史、增加企业对管理者的信任、增加管理者的每期收入、加大对短期行为的惩罚。该研究对管理者激励有一定的价值。This paper applies sequential reciprocity equilibrium behavioral game theory model to the analysis of horizon problem of executives by a centipede game. We bring anticipation factor which is also called instrumental reciprocity into the model and find that there are five approaches to settle horizon problem. They are increasing anticipation value, longer cooperation history, highly trust, generous wage and severe punishment for gamble behavior. The results have certain value for manager incentive.

关 键 词：行为博弈 序贯互惠均衡 时限问题 内在互惠 帮助性互惠 

分 类 号：C936[经济管理—管理学]