价格约束机制和违约惩罚约束机制的对比分析  

Comparative Analysis between Mechanism of Price-restricted and Default-restricted

作　　者：谷文林[1] 

机构地区：[1]河海大学商学院,江苏南京210098

出　　处：《工业工程与管理》2005年第5期23-26,共4页Industrial Engineering and Management

摘　　要：通过价格约束机制和违约惩罚约束机制比较分析得出,在销售商的灵活订货的策略下,制造商不能利用价格杠杆来约束销售商的行为。如果在购销合同中引进惩罚条款,制造商则可以利用违约惩罚机制约束销售商的灵活订货的行为,合适的违约罚金使得供销双方形成双赢局面。This paper compares the mechanism of price-restricted with the mechanism of defaultrestricted and shows that manufacturers restrict retailers＇ behavior with price leverage under the strategy of flexible order. If punishment item is introduced into the contract of purchase and sale, then the manufacturers will utilize default punishment to restrict flexible orders from retailers. And suitable default fine makes both the producers and retailers fully satisfied.

关 键 词：价格约束 违约 灵活定购 期望值 

分 类 号：F273[经济管理—企业管理]