单供应商面对具有多个销售点的零售商时的VMI模型研究  

Study of VMI Model When a Supplier Faces a Retailer Who Possesses of Several Retail Points

作　　者：蔡建湖[1] 黄卫来[1] 程海芳[1] 

机构地区：[1]华中科技大学管理学院,湖北武汉430074

出　　处：《工业工程与管理》2005年第5期56-60,共5页Industrial Engineering and Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70271027)

摘　　要：在供应商管理用户库存(VM I)环境中,当面临的具体条件不同时,供应商和零售商的利润分配是不同的,论述了当一个供应商面对具有多个销售点的零售商时的VM I模型,此时供应商负责库存决策,他可以在各个销售点之间转运(Transshipment)库存。建立了供应商和零售商的一个Stackelberg博弈,零售商作为领导者是通过决定销售价格来体现的。结果显示最终供应商和零售商可以达到一个子博弈精练纳什均衡,零售商在该模式下获得了很大的利润份额。给出了一个算例计算了均衡时的库存量和销售价格。In the case of vendor managed inventory （ VMI）, the profit allocation between a supplier and a retailer is different when conditions are different. A special VMI model is discussed when a supplier faces a retailer who possesses of several retail points, and the supplier can transship inventory between different retail points. The interaction between the supplier and the retailer is modeled as a Stackelberg game with complete information, where the retailer acts as a leader by setting the retail price. It is shown that Stackelberg-Nash equilibria exist in our dynamic game model. And the retailer obtains a great share of benefit from this mode. Our findings are illustrated by a numerical example at last.

关 键 词：供应链 VMI STACKELBERG博弈 转运 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理]