基于非对称信息的工程监理激励机制研究  

The Study on Supervision Institution Incentive System Based on Asymmetric Information

作　　者：曹玉贵[1] 杨忠直[2] 

机构地区：[1]天津大学管理学院,天津300072 [2]上海交通大学管理学院,上海200052

出　　处：《中国工程科学》2005年第10期69-72,共4页Strategic Study of CAE

基　　金：河南省教育厅自然科学基金资助项目(2004110002)

摘　　要：通过建立考虑业主投资规模、工程监理特质和外生随机变量及其影响程度等因素的业主与工程监理之间的委托-代理模型,分析了非对称信息下工程投资规模、工程监理特质和外生随机变量等因素对激励报酬系数的影响。同时,基于分析和研究结果,提出了设计工程监理激励机制必须考虑的影响因素。The principal-agent model between employers and engineering supervisors is established, considering such factors as the scale of employers＇ investment, special character of engineering supervision and exogenous random variable and its influence. And the influence of these factors on the sensitiveness of compensation performance under asymmetric information is analyzed. Based on the result, factors to be considered while establishing the incentive system of engineering supervision are put forward.

关 键 词：项目业主 工程监理 委托代理 激励机制 

分 类 号：F224.32[经济管理—国民经济]