浅析上市公司“资金占用”问题  

作　　者：宋宝萍[1] 强力[2] 

机构地区：[1]西安电子科技大学,陕西西安710071 [2]西北政法学院,陕西西安710063

出　　处：《攀登（哲学社会科学版）》2005年第5期89-92,共4页New Heights(Philosophy and Social Science)

摘　　要：上市公司“资金占用”问题,既反映出大股东与中小股东的利益冲突,也反映了现行法律制度对此的规范和约束存在缺陷。本文针对控股股东利用合同形式和滥用控制权直接侵占资源的问题,对“资金占用”行为进行了分类定性,提出制定和完善相关法律制度的基本思路。The problem of coming into market corporation to appropriate fund either reflecting the issue of interest conflict within big shareholder and middle, small types stockholder, or reacting the serious problem that existing in the current law system for standardizing and restraining it. This pappcr focusscs on the issues that the proprietary shareholder manipulates contract and misuses domination to appropriate directly, defines the nature and classify the behavior of appropriating funds, brought forward the basic thoughtway of setting down and improving relevant law systems to prevent beforehand the problem of appropriating funds, controll when doing that and to relieve after have don that.

关 键 词：上市公司 控股股东 资金占用 法律规制 资金占用 上市公司 法律制度 利益冲突 中小股东 合同形式 控股股东 大股东 控制权 

分 类 号：F275.1[经济管理—企业管理] F279.246[经济管理—国民经济]