分销系统中的多主多从Stackelberg主从对策问题研究  

The Analysis on Stackelberg Problem with Multiple Leaders-follwers in Distribution System

作　　者：田厚平[1] 郭亚军[2] 刘长贤[2] 

机构地区：[1]南京理工大学经济管理学院,江苏南京210094 [2]东北大学工商管理学院,辽宁沈阳110004

出　　处：《管理工程学报》2005年第4期74-78,共5页Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management

基　　金：国家科技部资助项目(2003EE550001);辽宁省科技厅软科学资助项目(2002401107)

摘　　要：研究了两个分销系统(每个分销系统具有一个作为主方的生产商和一个作为从方的分销商)发生相互竞争的问题。在生产商的产品具有部分替代性,产品的市场最终需求对于服务水平敏感———如果某分销商服务水平增加而对手不变时,该分销商可以在开拓市场的同时,吸引对手的顾客。每个生产商面临如何激励自己的分销商努力工作以最大化自己利益的问题。对两生产商合作与非合作情况分别进行了分析。仿真结果表明,生产商在非合作时都有给自己的分销商提供奖金激励的动机,而在合作时都不提供奖金反而使生产商的利润有所提高。这或许能够解释在当今市场上,为什么生产商向分销商提供奖金的情况较为常见,原因可能在于合作达成具有各种困难。Competition between two distribution systems have been discussed in the paper. Each system has one manufacture as leader and one retailer as follower. On the basis of the assumption that the demand of every manufacture＇ s product is sensitive to service level, and the products have partly substitution, the problem how the manufactures incentive their retailers to improve the service level in order to increase the profits was discussed. At the same time cooperation and non-cooperation between the two manufactures were analyzed. The simulation results show that the two manufactures both have intension to incentive the retailers in non-cooperation situation, however manufactures, cooperation is efficient to improve their profits and in the situation the manufactures will have no motion to incentive the retailers. Although cooperation is better to the manufactures, it has some difficulty to cooperate in the market because of many factors that influence the cooperation. It may explain why the phenomenon that manufactures always incentive their retailers exists in the market.

关 键 词：主从对策 供应链 合作 激励机制 进化博弈论 

分 类 号：O225[理学—运筹学与控制论] F252[理学—数学]