养老金积极主义与公司治理  

Pension Funds Activism and Corporate Governance

作　　者：刘子兰[1] 刘万[1] 

机构地区：[1]湖南师范大学商学院,湖南长沙410081

出　　处：《湖南师范大学社会科学学报》2005年第6期80-83,共4页Journal of Social Science of Hunan Normal University

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目"社会保障基金安全运行问题研究"(04CJY025);湖南省教育厅基金项目(03C224)

摘　　要：公司治理命题产生于公司所有权和控制权分离所形成的委托代理问题。20世纪90年代,美国兴起了以养老基金为主导的股东积极主义运动,倡导养老金积极主义运动的养老基金等机构投资者参与公司治理,能在一定程度上解决委托代理问题。但是,公共养老基金和私人养老基金参与公司治理还存在一定差异性。此外,养老金积极主义发展过程中表现出了一些新的特征也值得关注,这显示现代公司治理模式发展到了一个新阶段。Corporate governance aroses from solving the principle-agent problems caused by the separation of the owner-ship and management, the shareholders activism mainly led by the pension funds arising in the early 1990s in US will be able to partly solve these problems. However, there are some differences in the degree of participating in the corporate governance between public pension funds and private pension funds. Besides, there are some inherent principleagent problems in those funds too. This paper also concisely depicts the traits of the shareholders activism nowadays which indicates that the modern corporate governance is being on the access to the new phase characterized by the institutional investors＇ capitalism model.

关 键 词：养老基金 机构投资者 养老金积极主义 股东积极主义 公司治理 

分 类 号：F276.6[经济管理—企业管理]