信息非对称对企业债务期限选择的影响分析  

On the Effect of Asymmetric Information upon Enterprise Debt Maturity Choice

作　　者：谢赤[1] 胡爱军[1] 熊正德[1] 

机构地区：[1]湖南大学工商管理学院,湖南长沙410082

出　　处：《长沙理工大学学报（社会科学版）》2005年第4期58-60,共3页Journal of Changsha University of Science and Technology：Social Science

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目"利率市场化条件下的仿射期限结构模型及其在货币政策分析中的应用研究"(项目编号:03BJY099);湖南省社科基金项目"我国商业银行内部控制系统及实证研究"(项目编号:04CZ022)

摘　　要：债务期限结构是企业融资结构中的一个重要问题。文章从信息非对称导致的逆向选择和道德风险两个方面出发,研究了债务期限选择对企业的影响,并指出:逆向选择下出现分离均衡时企业债务期限具有信号显示功能,即高质量企业选择更多的短期债务来传递高质量信号,低质量企业只能选择长期债务;同时债务期限与道德风险引起的债务代理成本有紧密的关系,缩短债务期限有利于降低债务代理成本。The firm＇ s debt maturity structure is an important part of financing structure. Based on the analysis of adverse selection and moral hazard of asymmetric information, this article studies the effet of debt maturity on the value of the enterprise. It shows that debt maturity has a signaling function at the occurrence of separating equilibrium under the condition of adverse selection, which is to say, good firms issue short-term debt to signal his quality and bad firms have to choose to issue long-term debt. In addition, it also proves that debt maturity has an important correlation with debt agency cost so that the shortening of debt maturity structure can lower debt agency cost caused by debt maturity and morality risk.

关 键 词：信息非对称 债务期限 短期债务 长期债务 

分 类 号：F275.1[经济管理—企业管理]