国有企业委托代理问题及对策  

Principal-agent problems and countermeasures of state-owned enterprises

作　　者：刘志强[1] 王润良[1] 崔志霞[1] 

机构地区：[1]河北工程学院经管学院,河北邯郸056038

出　　处：《河北建筑科技学院学报（社会科学版）》2005年第4期16-17,共2页Journal of Hebei Institute of Architectural Science & Technology(Social Science Edition)

摘　　要：国有企业在进行股份制改造后,就在所有者与经营者之间形成了委托代理关系,即所有者委托经营者为实现所有者的利益而从事某些活动。本文通过分析我国国有企业委托代理链中的各个环节,找出我国国有企业由于存在多级契约安排而引起的多层委托代理问题,从而探讨完善我国公司治理结构的对策及措施。为我国国有企业改革提供有益的理论指导。Principal - agent relation is formed between owners and operators, after state - owned enterprises are stock rebuilt. That is to say, owners consign operators to engage in some activities, in order to realize owners＇ interests. This paper finds out muhilayer principal- agent problems of state - owned enterprises, which are due to the existence of multilevel contracts. Accordingly, some countermeasures and measures on perfecting corporation management are discussed. Academic guidance is presented to state- owned enterprises＇ innovation. Key words： state- owned enterprises; principal- agent chain; bidirectional controlling balance mechanism

关 键 词：国有企业 委托代理链 双向制衡机制 

分 类 号：F270[经济管理—企业管理]