有限套利与企业市场价值  

Limited Arbitrage and Enterprise's Market Value

作　　者：冉生欣[1] 

机构地区：[1]华东师范大学商学院,上海200062

出　　处：《南京理工大学学报》2005年第6期755-758,共4页Journal of Nanjing University of Science and Technology

基　　金：华东师范大学2005年优秀博士生培养基金

摘　　要：以有限套利理论为基础,在假定市场投资者(套利者)面临信贷约束和利率多样化的前提下,该文从分析投资者有限套利行为的角度研究了企业资本结构与其市场价值的关系,并得到如下结论:当投资者面临信贷配给或较企业更高的借款利率时,企业举债是有利的,即此时的企业市场价值高于不举债时的市场价值;而且,随着企业杠杆度的不断提高,投资者的有限套利行为将使企业的破产风险增大。Based on the limited arbitrage theory and the assumption that the investors are confronted with credit constraints or interest rate differential, this paper studies the relationship between enterprise＇ s capital structure and its market value by means of analyzing the investors＇ limited arbitrage behavior. The conclusion is that, even if the other conditions of MM Theorem 1 are not changed when the investors are confronted with credit constraints or interest rate differential, the enterprise＇ s capital structure can also affect its market value, that is, the leverage enterprise＇ market value is often higher than that of others. Furthermore, with the enterprises＇ leverage ratio increasing, their bankrupt risk rises because of the investors＇ limited arbitrage.

关 键 词：有限套利 市场价值 资本结构 信贷配给 利率多样化 

分 类 号：F83[经济管理—金融学]