债权融资下的控制权安排  

The Arrangement of Control Rights in Debt Financing

作　　者：王勇[1] 

机构地区：[1]清华大学经济学研究所,北京100084

出　　处：《南开学报（哲学社会科学版）》2006年第1期133-140,共8页Nankai Journal:Philosophy,Literature and Social Science Edition

摘　　要：在控制权具有私人收益的情况下,它对于企业家具有激励作用;同时,由于存在道德风险,债权人可以运用控制权来保障自己的回报,因此,控制权对于债权人又具有承兑作用,这两种作用相互冲突,必然会对债务融资控制权的安排带来影响。债务融资下,最佳的控制权安排取决于控制权两种作用之间的权衡,并非人们通常认为的债务越多。Control right has incentive effect on the entrepreneur so long he ensures his private benefits from that right, however, since the creditor may use control right to safeguard his returns in the case of moral bazard, it commits a encashment promise to the creditor as well. The conflicts between them may influence arrangement of control rights in debt financing. This paper holds that the best arrangement of control rights in debt financing depends on the tradeoff between its incentive and commitment effects, instead of the opinion that the more is the debt, the more control rights the creditor should get.

关 键 词：债权融资 控制权安排 道德风险 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理]