基于业绩评价的经营者激励与约束机制的博弈分析  

The Game Analysis of Manager's Incentive-constraint Mechanism Based on Performance Assessment

作　　者：马跃如[1] 李海[1] 

机构地区：[1]中南大学商学院,湖南长沙410083

出　　处：《湖南师范大学社会科学学报》2006年第1期76-79,共4页Journal of Social Science of Hunan Normal University

摘　　要：经营者的激励与约束机制是现代激励问题中的一个很重要却难以解决的问题,业绩评价是经营者激励与约束机制的基础。建立基于线性业绩模型和线性激励模型基础上的激励与约束机制分析模型,通过对经营者与股东之间的动态博弈分析,分析经营者的行为变量、业绩分享系数、股东监督力度之间的关系,为如何有效约束经营者的负面行为,并使业绩评价与激励机制挂钩提供了一种分析工具。Incentive-constraint mechanism for managers is a very important problem among the modem incentive problems though it is hard to deal with. Performance assessment is the basis of the Incentive-constraint mechanism for manager. The paper uses the game theory and information ecomomics theory to set up an Incentive-constraint mechanism analyzing model based on firm＇s linearizing performance model and motive linearizing model. By the game dynamic analysis between manger and stockholder, the author analyses the relation among the variable of the behaviors of manager, sharing performance quotiety and stockholder＇s supervision intensity and provides an analysis tool for effective restraint of manager＇ s negative behavior and strengthen the relation between performance assessment and incentive mechanism.

关 键 词：动态博弈 信息经济学 激励 约束 业绩评价 

分 类 号：F272[经济管理—企业管理]