中国上市公司的负债是否发挥控制作用  

Constraining Power of Debts in Chinese Listed Companies

作　　者：沈艺峰[1] 沈洪涛[2] 张俊生[1] 

机构地区：[1]厦门大学管理学院财务研究与发展中心,福建厦门361005 [2]暨南大学管理学院,广东广州510632

出　　处：《证券市场导报》2006年第2期43-50,共8页Securities Market Herald

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(批准号:70372033)

摘　　要：本文以陷入财务困境的ST公司为样本,检验当公司陷入财务困境的情况下,负债控制机制是否对公司高层管理人员起到监督作用。检验结果表明,当ST公司陷入财务困境时,高层管理人员变更概率与公司负债比率之间不存在显著的正相关关系;负债比率高的ST公司高层管理人员变动的频率与负债比率低的ST公司高层管理人员变动的频率之间没有显著的差异;高层管理人员在离任时所遭受的个人财富损失不会因为公司负债水平的高低不同而出现显著的差别。综合而言,我国上市公司负债机制没有发挥相应的控制作用。This paper takes as example some indebted ST companies to see whether this situation has some constraining power over their senior management. The test shows that debts do not necessarily lead to the removal of senior officers. This situation does not show marked difference between companies in sharply different financial status. Personal financial loss suffered by senior officer when they choose to quit does not differ considerably based on the financial condition of the companies they serve. In general, debt system fails to impose constraining power over the related listed companies.

关 键 词：负债机制 ST公司 公司治理 

分 类 号：F276.6[经济管理—企业管理]