一定民主条件下司法审查制度设计的经济学分析  

Economic Analysis of Judicial Review Design under Certainly Democratic Level

作　　者：秦尚琛[1] 吴功德[2] 

机构地区：[1]中南财经政法大学,湖北武汉430073 [2]中国科学技术大学,安徽合肥230026

出　　处：《安徽警官职业学院学报》2005年第6期21-23,共3页Journal of Anhui Vocational College of Police Officers

摘　　要：民主最大化是一种理想状态,立法和执法者的“经济人”本性和信息的不对称使得民主最大化无法实现,同时也为司法审查的产生提供了现实的基础。本文试以经济学的视角,在分析司法审查设计的供求关系和内部分配偏好的基础上,试图寻找一定民主条件下司法审查设计的最优结合点。The democracy maximization is a kind of perfect condition, and the unsymmetry, which existed between legislation and ＂the economic man＂ the law enforcement officer＇s the nature and information, causes the democracy maximization to be unable to realize. At the same time, it also has provided the reality foundation for the appearance of judicial review. This article, from the angle of economics, analyses the supply and demand relations of judicature review design and its internal assignment, attempts to seek the most superior combining site tinder certain democracy.

关 键 词：司法审查 民主 效用 无差异曲线 预算线 司法审查制度 经济学分析 设计 “经济人” 理想状态 

分 类 号：D926[政治法律—法学] F270[经济管理—企业管理]