独立董事的相对独立性与发挥作用的途径  

The Way of the Independent Director on the Comparative Independence and Role Play

作　　者：唐清泉[1] 

机构地区：[1]中山大学管理学院

出　　处：《上海管理科学》2006年第1期38-41,共4页Shanghai Management Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目<我国设立独立董事的动机与效果研究>(70272021)的研究成果。

摘　　要：本文的实证结果表明独立董事报酬无论与内部董事,还是与管理高层的整体报酬之间都呈现显著的正相关关系,这说明独立董事具有相对独立性是不以人的意志为转移的客观事实。在此基础上,研究了相对独立性对监督有效性带来的影响。结果表明,尽管独立董事只具有相对的独立性,但只要能挖掘出符合相对独立性要求的机制来激励独立董事做更多实实在在的工作,具有高认知能力的独立董事依然能在上市公司的治理中有效地发挥作用。The empirical evidenance in the paper demomstrates that the compemsation of independent director has correlated significantly with that of both inside directors and top manegement in Chinese listed companies. This implicates that independent directors have only relative independency and thereby investigages problems in supervising functions. The results shows that though with relative independency, independent directors with high quality of cognitre ability still have good roles in corporate governance by exploring some incentive mechanisms and instruments to make independent directors be steadfast to their works for the stockholders based on the relative independency.

关 键 词：董事会 独立董事 独立性 监督 

分 类 号：F279.246[经济管理—企业管理]