创业资本的分阶段融资激励与控制权分配——基于信息不对称的视角  

Incentive Capital in Staged Finance and The allocation Control rights——Review of Asymmetric Information

作　　者：李金龙[1] 费方域[1] 谈毅[1] 

机构地区：[1]上海交通大学管理学院,上海200052

出　　处：《山西财经大学学报》2006年第1期90-96,共7页Journal of Shanxi University of Finance and Economics

摘　　要：文章在激励基础上,对创业投资中特有的分阶段融资和控制权转移现象进行了研究。对于分阶段融资,文献研究从企业家发生道德风险的角度出发,不可避免出现了一些问题和矛盾,而对于控制权分配和转移问题,Aghion和Bolton的经典CTM模型对信息对称的假设,不符合创业投资的实际情况。文章从信息角度出发,放松了CTM系列模型有关信息对称的假设条件,并在不完全合同理论框架下对分阶段融资和控制权展开研究,得到了一系列结论。The hypothesis of in the classic CTM is analyzed in this paper. The conclusion found that there is a relation between the informarion and the invest incentive or the allocation of the control rights. For example, if the information is good enough that the invest incentive is big and the control rights are contingent transfer; but under justly conditions, the invest incentive is poor and VC get full control; if the information is bad, there is no investment. All this research is the relation of information; invest incentive and allocation of control rights in staged finance.

关 键 词：信息不对称 分阶段融资 控制权分配 

分 类 号：F832.48[经济管理—金融学]