生产商对经销商的最优返利设计  

Design of Optimal Rebate of Manufacturer to Dealers

作　　者：胡培[1] 谭德庆[1] 喻碧君[2] 

机构地区：[1]西南交通大学经济管理学院,四川成都610031 [2]西南交通大学计划财务处,四川成都610031

出　　处：《西南交通大学学报》2005年第6期803-805,共3页Journal of Southwest Jiaotong University

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70371045)

摘　　要：为了获得生产商对经销商激励的最优返利水平和实施返利要求的最低销售量,构建了生产商与经销商的博弈模型,并对模型进行了分析.分析表明,生产商对其经销商的最优返利水平随对手经销商产品价格的上涨而下降,返利要求的最低销量随产品社会需求的增加和对手生产商提供其经销商的产品价格的提高而增大,随本企业提供给经销商的产品价格的提高而下降,与经销商的产品市场价格无关.To solve the problems of the optimal rebate standard of manufacturers to sealers and the lowest sales volume corresponding to the standard to stimulate dealers＇ efforts and gain more profits, a game model between the relationship of a manufacturer and its sealers was set up and analyzed. The research shows that the optimal rebate of a manufacturer to its sealers falls with the increase of rival dealers＇ product price, and that the lowest sales volume demanded by the optimal rebate increases with the increases of total social demand for a product and product price given by a rival manufacturer to its sealers, falls with the raise of product price given the manufacturer to itself sealers, and has no relation to the market price of the product.

关 键 词：博弈 最优返利 设计 

分 类 号：F273.7[经济管理—企业管理]