机构投资者、董事会与经营者股票期权激励问题研究  

A Study on Institutional Investors, Board of Directors and Stock Option Incentive Mechanism for Executives

作　　者：曾德明[1] 姚璇[1] 

机构地区：[1]湖南大学工商管理学院,湖南长沙410082

出　　处：《经济经纬》2006年第2期107-109,149,共4页Economic Survey

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目(01BJL022)教育部人文社会科学"十五"规划第一批项目(01JD790021)。

摘　　要：机构投资者对经营者薪酬的直接监控和间接监控作用,缓解了因股东和经营者利益冲突而造成的代理问题。机构投资者通过对董事会构成两因素(董事会成员数量和成员类型)施加影响,使董事会能够公正客观地评价公司高管人员,从而奠定有效激励与约束高管团队人员的前提和基础。针对中国上市公司经营者激励的现状,我国的股票期权激励应从优化国有企业所有权结构,发展积极的机构投资者;优化董事会结构,提高外部董事比例等方面加以改进和完善。How institutional investors should motivate and restrict executives through the board of directors is an important corporate governance issue and a dark box that needs to be opened. Through analyzing the reasons why institutional investors should motivate and restrict executives, this paper studies the influence of institutional investors and board of directors on stock option incentive mechanism for executives, and in combination with the factual incentive problem for the executives of Chinese listed companies, the author puts forward some suggestions on establishing stock option incentive mechanism in our country, expecting to provide some reference for perfecting incentive mechanism for executives in listed companies and improving the performance of listed companies.

关 键 词：机构投资者 董事会 股票期权激励 公司绩效 

分 类 号：F271[经济管理—企业管理]