基于循环经济模式的政府激励与监督问题  

Incentive and Monitor Problems of Government Based on Cycle Economy Pattern

作　　者：张保银[1] 汪波[1] 吴煜[1] 

机构地区：[1]天津大学管理学院,天津300072

出　　处：《中国管理科学》2006年第1期136-141,共6页Chinese Journal of Management Science

摘　　要：为了研究循环经济模式下政府如何引导企业推行逆向物流战略,本文设计了二者之间在信息不对称情况下的激励和监督模型,分析了政府和企业如何订立优化合约,以及政府如何选择可行有效的监督力度。分析结果为政府激励和监督企业推行逆向物流战略进行制度设计提供了理论支持。In order to study how government induces enterprises put reverse logistics strategy in practice based on cycle economy pattern, this paper designs an incentive and monitor model for them under asymmetrical information, and analyzes how government and enterprises make the optional contract as information is asymmetrical, as well as government how to select the effective and feasible monitoring effort. The result provides a theoretic support for government to design the policy to inspirit and monitor enterprises in practising the reverse logistics strategy.

关 键 词：循环经济模式 逆向物流 委托-代理 激励合约 监督 

分 类 号：C939[经济管理—管理学]