信息不对称条件下的债务约束机制  

Debts constraint mechanism under the circumstance of asymmetric information

作　　者：张玉明[1] 

机构地区：[1]山东大学管理学院,山东济南250100

出　　处：《经济学家》2006年第2期84-89,共6页Economist

摘　　要：债务水平表达了企业经营的信息,投资者利用这种信息可以评估企业的质量。在信息不对称条件下,债务首先成为红利的有效替代形式,具有减少企业自由现金流的作用,从而对管理者起到市场监督和提高资金使用效率的作用;其次,当企业出现债务违约时,就要进入破产程序,且由债权人决定是否清算或重组,为避免这种情况的发生,企业管理者将债务保持在最优水平;再者,债务期限结构的匹配模型,使得企业管理者将债务的期限结构保持在科学合理的状态,从而实现资本结构的优化。Debts level reflects business operation information by which investors can evaluate businesses. Firstly, under the circumstance of asymmetric information, debts become an effective alternative of bonus and reduce free cash flows of businesses, which in turn encourage market supervision and improve fund use efficiency. Second, businesses have to follow the bankrupt procedure due to debts default, and it is up to debtors to decide whether the assets be liquidated or reconstructed. Business managers will try to keep their debts at the best level to avoid that case. Third, the matching model of debts maturity structure enables business managers to keep the structure at a reasonable level so as to optimize capital structure.

关 键 词：信息不对称 自由现金流量 清算价值 约束机制 资本结构 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理]