销售人员线性激励合同的信息经济学分析  

Information Economical Analysis of Linear Incentive Contract for Salesmen

作　　者：张立[1] 张德常[1] 

机构地区：[1]湘潭大学商学院,湖南湘潭411105

出　　处：《财经理论与实践》2006年第2期107-109,共3页The Theory and Practice of Finance and Economics

基　　金：湖南省教育厅基金项目(03C480)

摘　　要：销售经理往往很难监督销售人员是否努力工作,使得销售人员的激励合同很难基于销售人员的努力程度,而是基于销售人员的销售业绩。运用委托代理理论构建的销售人员基于销售业绩的线性契约,探讨销售提成系数以及基本工资的影响,有利于销售人员激励合同的确定。It is difficult for a sales manager to ascertain the effort of the salesmen. For this reason, the incentive contracts for salesmen are generally based on their performance of sale, rather than their effort. The application of linear incentive contract based on the principal - agent theory will be helpful for sales managers to determine the deduction percentage for salesmen, to analyze the influence of the deduction to the wage, and then to design the incentive contract for salesmen.

关 键 词：委托代理 销售业绩 线性激励契约 

分 类 号：F270.7[经济管理—企业管理]