国企并购中政企银三方利益取向及博弈  

Interest Orientation and Game of Government,Stated-owned Enterprise,Bank in Stated-owned Enterprises' M&As

作　　者：秦国文[1] 

机构地区：[1]湖南大学工商管理学院,湖南长沙410082

出　　处：《系统工程》2006年第2期28-31,共4页Systems Engineering

基　　金：国家社会科学基金资助项目(01BJY049)

摘　　要：国有企业并购的过程中政府、国有企业和国有银行各有不同的利益取向,三者在各自利益的驱动下进行着博弈。在对各自利益取向剖析的基础上,通过建立各博弈方之间的博弈模型,可以寻找出或证实制约并购博弈均衡结果的相关因素主要是国有资产委托-代理机制的健全程度、并购的相关法律制度的健全程度、对国有资产的监管力度、社会保障体制、政府的职能角色等等。Government,stated-owned enterprise and bank have different interest orientation in the process of stated-owned enterprises＇ M＆As, they game because of different interest driving. Based on analysis of their interest orientation, by creating game model among them, we can find out or confirm relevant factors that mainly restrict M＆As are integrity of state＆owned assets＇ deputation mechanism, integrity of M＆As＇ relevant legal system, supervision of stated owned assets, social .security mechanism, governments＇ function, and so on. Central government can accurately forecast and control equilibrium results in stated-owned enterprises＇ M＆As as long as quantifying relevant confinement factors.

关 键 词：国企并购 利益取向 博弈 

分 类 号：F271[经济管理—企业管理]