股权结构、会计操纵与投资者保护——来自中国上市公司的经验证据  

Share Structure,Accounting Manipulation and Investor Protection——Experience from China Listed Companies

作　　者：胡凯[1] 

机构地区：[1]西安交通大学,陕西西安710061

出　　处：《商业经济与管理》2006年第4期64-70,共7页Journal of Business Economics

摘　　要：在中国特殊的经济背景下,股权结构、会计操纵与投资者保护之间有着重要的关系。本文对中国上市公司2004年横截面数据的经验研究表明,在投资者保护缺乏的条件下,控股股东持股比例与会计操纵的概率负相关,控股股东的身份则与会计操纵的概率相关关系不显著。研究结果表明,一股独大并非没有益处,国有股减持和股权分置的解决必须建立在保护投资者利益的基础上,否则将不利于公司治理的优化。Against the special economic background in China, management and investor protection. Based on the empirical study, share holding and accounting manipulation and the non-obvious there exists the important relationship between share structure, accounting the paper holds, without investor protection, the negative correlation of correlation between of shareholder status and accounting manipulation. Because of the deficiency of unreasonable share structure, the diminishing of state share and reallceation must be on the basis of investor protection; otherwise, it will be not beneficial to the optimization of the coporate governance.

关 键 词：股权结构 会计操纵 公司治理 投资者保护 

分 类 号：F234.4[经济管理—会计学]