营销渠道经销商战略联盟动态和静态博弈形成机理比较  

Comparison between Dynamic and Static Game Formation Mechanism of Distributor Strategic Alliance in Marketing Channel

作　　者：陈洁[1] 何伟[1] 

机构地区：[1]上海交通大学安泰经济与管理学院,上海200052

出　　处：《上海交通大学学报》2006年第4期641-643,共3页Journal of Shanghai Jiaotong University

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70302017)

摘　　要：用博弈论的思想方法,通过静态和动态博弈两个角度基于古诺模型建立了经销商联盟模型,以此分析了经销商联盟的形成机理.研究表明:在静态博弈中,经销商联盟的利润比竞争的利润更大,最优的选择是经销商之间进行联盟;在动态博弈中,对于具有先行优势的经销商联盟的利润和竞争的利润一样,对于后行的经销商,联盟的利润比竞争的利润大,因此,经销商愿意进行联盟.This paper uses game theory thinking to establish a distributor alliance model from dynamic game and static game based on Cournot model so as to analyze the formation mechanism of the distributor strategic alliance. It is concluded that in static game the profit of distributor strategic alliance is larger than that in competition so that the optimal choice is to form distributor alliance; in dynamic game, for the antecedency distributor, the profit of distributor strategic alliance is the same as that in competition, while for another distributor, the profit of distributor strategic alliance is larger than that in competition so that it will choose distributor strategic alliance.

关 键 词：营销渠道 经销商战略联盟 动态博弈 静态博弈 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理]