企业报酬机制与人力资本投资  

The Compensation Mechanism of Enterprise and Investment in Human Capital

作　　者：田盈[1] 蒲勇健[1] 

机构地区：[1]重庆大学经济与工商管理学院

出　　处：《管理工程学报》2006年第2期24-27,共4页Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management

基　　金：教育部高校博士点科研基金(20020611009);教育部人文社会科学研究规划基金(02JA790062)

摘　　要：由于企业与员工双方都以自己的收益最大化为目标函数,所以当企业采取对产出按比例分成的报酬机制时,会导致双边道德风险,从而使员工实际的人力资本投资力度和工作努力程度以及企业的实际相关投入力度都低于整个社会福利最大化时的力度。如果企业能够采取另外一种报酬机制,使员工拥有完全剩余索取权,就能够使企业与员工都选择社会福利最大化时人力资本投资力度和工作努力程度以及相关投入力度。Because the enterprise and employee all want to maximize own income, so when enterprise adapts to the percentage compensation mechanism, there would exist double morals hazard. The degree of investment inhuman capital, working hard and the connected investment of enterprise will little than the degree which the enterprise and employee want to maximize whole social welfare. If the business emerprise can adopt another compensation mechanism, which makes the employee own the complete surplus, enterprise and employee will choose the degree of investment inhuman capital, working hard and the connected investment of enterprise, which the enterprise and employee want to maximize whole social welfare.

关 键 词：人力资本 投资 机制 激励 博弈 

分 类 号：F272.92[经济管理—企业管理] C962[经济管理—国民经济]