析存款保险和银行管理者薪酬监管模型  

作　　者：陈欣烨[1] 

机构地区：[1]上海财经大学国际工商管理学院,上海200439

出　　处：《保险研究》2006年第4期65-67,28,共4页Insurance Studies

摘　　要：由于道德风险及不完全契约的限制，根据资产风险状况收取差别保费的银行存款保险制度无法克服银行风险偏好问题。而有效的管理者薪酬结构有助于加强管理者的风险约束。将管理者薪酬结构参数纳入存款保险定价模型的建立，有利于建立涵盖存款保险制度与管理者薪酬结构的协同治理机制，可以有效避免管理者风险偏好。促进银行治理。Due to the restriction of moral risk and incomplete contract, the deposit insurance system which charges premium according to the risk level of assets can not overcome the problem of bank risk preference, But effective management compensation structure can reinforce management＇s propensity to risk constraint. Setting up a deposit insurance pricing model which has incorporated management compensation structure as a parameter will contribute to the construction of a coordinated governance mechanism embodying both of them. Such a mechanism is believed to be effective to avoid manager risk preference and promote bank governance.

关 键 词：银行治理 存款保险 道德风险 管理者薪酬 激励 监管 

分 类 号：F840.32[经济管理—保险]