国有企业经营者选择的制度冲突与对策  

Institutional Conflict in the Selection of State-owned Enterprise's Manager and the Countermeasures

作　　者：张宗浩[1] 胡伟清[1] 王丽辉[1] 

机构地区：[1]重庆科技学院经济系

出　　处：《重庆科技学院学报（社会科学版）》2006年第1期45-51,共7页Journal of Chongqing university of science and technology（social sciences edition）

摘　　要：在分析现行国有企业经营者选择机制的弊端的基础上,从政策和法律层面探讨了产生这些弊病的主要原因。国有企业经营者选择中的制度冲突,表现为国有企业经营的市场机制和经营者选择的行政机制的矛盾。主张在国有企业经营者选择中依法建立党政分开、政资分开、政企分开的国有资产管理新机制。The main drawback in the selection mechanism of state-owned enterprise＇s （SOE） manager and the reasons caused by policies and laws are discussed in this article. The institutional conflict in the selection of SOEs＇ manager is characterized as the contradiction between the market-based mechanism of SOEs＇ management and the government-based mechanism selected by SOEs＇ manager. A new management mechanism of SOE should be built up on the separation between the Party and the government, the government and the state-owned asset management, the government and the enterprise.

关 键 词：国有企业 经营者选择 制度冲突 

分 类 号：F271[经济管理—企业管理]