上市公司高级管理层报酬业绩敏感度与风险之间关系的实证检验  

Risk and Performance Pay Sensitivity in Managerial Compensation:Evidence from Listed Companies in China

作　　者：周嘉南[1] 黄登仕[1] 

机构地区：[1]西南交通大学经济管理学院,610031

出　　处：《会计研究》2006年第4期44-50,共7页Accounting Research

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目"激励与风险和管理者行为偏差的关系"(项目批准号:70572089)的阶段性成果

摘　　要：本文以中国上市公司2002-2004年度的高管人员报酬数据为基础,对高管人员的报酬业绩敏感度与风险之间的关系进行了实证分析。结果表明,中国上市公司高管人员的报酬与公司绩效、股东财富存在正相关关系,其报酬业绩敏感度与风险之间如经典代理理论所预测的那样存在负相关关系,但显著性较弱。进一步分析发现,对于那些增长机会很小或没有增长机会的公司,报酬业绩敏感度与风险存在负相关关系,而对于那些增长机会大的公司,报酬业绩敏感度与风险之间存在正相关关系,这在一定程度上拓展了经典代理理论的预测。Based on the data about Chinese listed Companies over period 2002—2004,this paper investigate the relationship between performance pay sensitivity and risk in managerial compensation.We find that the managerial compensation is positively correlated to companies' profitability and shareholders wealth,and as the classical agency theory predicts that,the performance pay sensitivity decreases with risk increases,whereas the evidence is somewhat weak.Then we go further to find that for those companies with low growth opportunity or even no growth opportunity,the performance pay sensitivity and risk are in negative correlation,while for those companies with great growth opportunity,the performance pay sensitivity tends to be positively correlated with risk,which to some extent expands the prediction of the classical agency theory.

关 键 词：报酬业绩敏感度 风险 增长机会 上市公司 

分 类 号：F224[经济管理—国民经济]