基于委托—代理的排污定价机制研究  

Study on the Pollution Pricing Mechanism Based on Principal-agent Theory

作　　者：任玉珑[1] 阳忠明[1] 李俊[1] 丁亮[1] 

机构地区：[1]重庆大学经济与工商管理学院,重庆400044

出　　处：《生态经济》2006年第6期34-36,共3页Ecological Economy

摘　　要：针对传统排污收费中没有对排污总量实施控制和对排污企业缺乏足够的治污激励,本文运用委托—代理理论和激励性规制理论,设计了一套排污定价机制。该机制从控制行业排污总量出发,通过对高污染企业实施惩罚,对低污染企业实施奖励,从而激励企业努力控制排污总量。该机制的实施,有助于高污染企业向低污染企业转移,但行业总产量仍能基本保持不变。In allusion to the traditional pollution charge deficiency which have no control of contamination gross and have not enough incentive to promote firms to control pollution, this paper designs a pollution pricing mechanism using principal-agent theory and incentive regulation theory. The mechanism controls the industrial pollution gross by punishing the high polluted firms and guerdon the low polluted firms. The output of products transferred from high-polluted firms to low-polluted firms by putting the mechanism into practice, and the industrial production gross have nearly no change.

关 键 词：委托-代理 激励性规制 排污定价机制 

分 类 号：F272.91[经济管理—企业管理]