不完全合同、创新与联合投资  

Incomplete Contract,Innovation Incentives and Syndication in Venture Capital

作　　者：李金龙[1] 费方域[1] 谈毅[1] 

机构地区：[1]上海交通大学安泰经济与管理学院,上海200052

出　　处：《财经科学》2006年第6期74-80,共7页Finance & Economics

摘　　要：本文结合美国硅谷的实际情况,基于不完全合同理论从联合投资和创新激励二者之间的关系展开研究。通过建立两期模型研究认为,合同不完全正是导致创业资本家发生窃取行为的客观原因。这种情况下,企业家和创业资本家双方的努力投入是不足的;而通过联合投资可以使得投资双方的努力投入达到最优,并给出了最优的联合投资规模。Taking the practice of Silicon Valley into consideration, this paper explores the relations between syndication in venture capital and innovation incentives based on the incomplete contract theory. To construct a twoperiod model, we found that the incomplete contract is the very reason that the venture capitalists conduct stealing behavior. Under this situation, neither entrepreneurs nor venture capitalists make enough efforts. However, syndication in venture capital can optimize both of their efforts. We also provide the optimal syndicate venture capital scale.

关 键 词：创业资本 联合投资 不完全合同 创新 声誉 

分 类 号：F270[经济管理—企业管理]