汽车备件供应中整车厂与特约维修站的博弈  

Game of OEM and Authorized Automobile Maintenance Station in Auto Service Parts Supply

作　　者：陈凤[1] 宋豫川[1] 尹家绪[1] 刘飞[1] 

机构地区：[1]重庆大学机械工程学院重庆,400030

出　　处：《重庆大学学报（自然科学版）》2006年第5期1-4,共4页Journal of Chongqing University

基　　金：国家863项目(20004AA414060)

摘　　要：运用博弈分析方法对备件供应中整车厂与特约维修站之间的策略进行了分析,通过建立单阶段和多阶段博弈模型,揭示了现实生活中特约维修站的违规现象是不可避免的,它的存在是博弈均衡的必然结果,并给出了均衡结果.同时,分析了整车厂对特约维修站的经济惩罚额度及监控成本等关键因素对均衡结果的影响.The strategies of OEM and authorized automobilemaintenance station in auto service parts supply are analyzed by game theory. It is salmost impossible to eliminate the phenomena of immoralbusiness behavior by constructing the models of one - stage game and multistage games. And the equilibrium strategy is deduced. Some key factors including the sum of economic punishment that the automobile manufacturer monitoring regulation punishes maintenance stations and monitoring cost are also analyzed.

关 键 词：汽车备件监管 纳什均衡 收益矩阵 博弈 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理]