审计委员会的财务监督效率:制度成因与改革路径  

Financial Supervision Efficiency of Audit Committee: Institutional Formation Causes and Reforming Path

作　　者：吴清华[1] 王平心[1] 王颖[1] 

机构地区：[1]西安交通大学管理学院,陕西西安710049

出　　处：《西安交通大学学报（社会科学版）》2006年第3期13-19,共7页Journal of Xi'an Jiaotong University：Social Sciences

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(70172010)

摘　　要：探讨了现代企业和公司治理理论上审计委员会的本源性质及运作机理,进而揭示了中国上市公司审计委员会制度被扭曲的现实与成因;同时借助一个博弈分析框架,指出试图单纯地通过加强对审计委员会“不尽职”的惩罚,无法从根本上解决或缓解内部控制人与股东等利益相关者之间的代理问题;进而提出解决审计委员会制度失效的路径在于通过重新定位审计委员会的治理角色和营造适宜的运作环境以激发其潜在的监督效能,即回归其本源的制度性质。The paper deals with the original attributes and operating mechanism of the audit committee according to the theory of the governance of modern enterprises and companies, and further discloses the distortion and its causes of the system of the audit committee of the Chinese listed company. At the same time, by a simple game analysis framework, it also points out that it is impossible to solve or alleviate the agency problem between inside controllers and the interest-related sides like outside investors when trying to simply increase the penalty level for ＂ failing to fulfill its duty＂ behavior of the audit committee. Finally, the paper presents the reforming path to deal with the poor governance of the audit committee, namely, it is, in the long run, necessary to newly define the audit committee＇s governance role and to create a governance environment suitable for stimulating its potential supervision function, that is, to regress its institutional nature.

关 键 词：审计委员会 上市公司治理 现代企业 财务监督 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理] F239.22[经济管理—国民经济]