“民工荒”现象博弈分析  

Analysis of the Existing of "the Shortage of Countryside Labor"

作　　者：黄淑芹[1] 朱建青[1] 杨绪华[2] 

机构地区：[1]信息工程大学理学院,河南郑州450001 [2]信息工程大学科研部,河南郑州450002

出　　处：《信息工程大学学报》2006年第2期200-203,共4页Journal of Information Engineering University

基　　金：郑州市科技计划项目(04DA61ABRD13)

摘　　要：从博弈论的角度分析当前比较热门的“民工荒”现象,利用不完全信息博弈理论建立民工与雇主之间信息不对称的多目标优化数学模型。此模型改进了一般的信号传递博弈模型,将参与人Ⅰ的类型信息由传统的离散型转化为连续型,进行分析计算,得到连续的均衡结果,对“民工荒”产生的原因进行分析研究,从模型所得结果、结论中总结出“民工荒”现象存在的原因及其必然性,并给出减少乃至于消除这种反常现象的一些建议。This paper analyzes the hot phenomenon of ＂the shortage of countryside labor＂ currently, using the theory of dynamic game of incomplete information to build an ex-goals optimistic mathematical model about the information asymmetry between countryside labor and employer. This signaling game changes playerl＇s traditional dispersed style to continuing style to analyze and calculate it, get the continuing equilibrium. To analyze and research the reason of ＂the shortage of countryside labor＂, from the result of the model we summarize the inevitability of the ＂the shortage of countryside labor＂ phenomenon, finally give some suggestions to reduce and eliminate this abnormal phenomenon.

关 键 词：民工 雇主 信息传递博弈 

分 类 号：O22[理学—运筹学与控制论]