是与善的分类及其意义——从亚里士多德哲学中开出“元实践学”的尝试  

Classification of Being and Good and Its Significance——An Attempt to Develop Meta-praxeology from Aristotle's Philosophy

作　　者：徐长福[1] 

机构地区：[1]中山大学马克思主义哲学与中国现代化研究所,广州510275

出　　处：《南京大学学报（哲学．人文科学．社会科学）》2006年第3期111-118,共8页Journal of Nanjing University(Philosophy,Humanities and Social Sciences)

基　　金：国家社科基金项目(05BZX004)

摘　　要：柏拉图把理念的“善”看作万有的太阳,这个“善”同时又是最真的“是”,二者是一个整体。他主张人要从认识万有上升到认识“善”,再把对这个“善”的认识带回到改变万有的实践之中。亚里士多德把“是”分为十个范畴,并否认“是”本身是一个超越它们之上的种,同时认为“善”跟“是”一样具有多种意义,实践中的“善”都是具体的,“善”的理念对实践没有意义,从而把对“是”的研究和对“善”的研究分离开来,把理论问题和实践问题分离开来。为解决理论领域的普遍性和根本性问题,亚里士多德建立了“形上学”,但实践领域的“形上学”却付之阙如。事物的存在是浑然一体的,在理论上被分成范畴的认识在实践中如何合成整体,这就是“元实践学”或“实践的形上学”所要研究的问题。In Plato, the form of good is the sun of beings in the world, and the good is what really is to the ultimate extent. Being and good are thus in unity. Plato claims that people should go upwards from opinions of beings to the knowledge of the good, with which, then return downwards to exercise the improvement of the world. Aristotle classifies being into ten categories, beyond which, he denies, is a genus of being itself, meanwhile maintaining that “ good” has as many senses as “being” does, and the goods in practice are all particulars, and the form of good is useless for practice. Thereby he makes a distinction between studies of being and studies of good, and between theoretical sciences and practical sciences. Aristotle establishes Metaphysics for the theoretical realm to settle its universal and fundamental issues, but no counterpart for practical realm. Since the existence of a thing is an integral whole, it is the theme of meta-praxeology, or rather metaphysics of practice, that how various kinds of knowledge theoretically categorized should be integrated into a whole in and for practice.

关 键 词：是 善 柏拉图 亚里士多德 元实践学 

分 类 号：B502.233[哲学宗教—外国哲学]