Commission Strategy of the Auction House  

作　　者：WANG Yan~ 1,2 1. College of Economics, Fudan University, Shanghai 200433, China 2. School of Mathematics and Statistics, Wuhan University , Wuhan 430072, Hubei, China 

出　　处：《Wuhan University Journal of Natural Sciences》2006年第3期507-510,共4页武汉大学学报（自然科学英文版）

基　　金：Supported by the National Natural Science Foun-dation of China (70071012)

摘　　要：In a SIPV model, when the commission proportion is not certain, but related with bargain price, generally, it is a linear function of the bargain price, this paper gives bidders＇ equilibrium bidding strategies in the first-and secondprice auctions. We find that the equilibrium strategies in second-price auction are dominant strategies. For seller or auction house, whether the fixed proportion or the unfixed proportion is good is not only related with constant item and the linear coefficient of the linear function, the size of the fixed commission proportion, but also related with the value of the item auctioned. So, in the practical auctions, the seller and the auction house negotiated with each other to decide the commission rules for their own advantage.In a SIPV model, when the commission proportion is not certain, but related with bargain price, generally, it is a linear function of the bargain price, this paper gives bidders＇ equilibrium bidding strategies in the first-and secondprice auctions. We find that the equilibrium strategies in second-price auction are dominant strategies. For seller or auction house, whether the fixed proportion or the unfixed proportion is good is not only related with constant item and the linear coefficient of the linear function, the size of the fixed commission proportion, but also related with the value of the item auctioned. So, in the practical auctions, the seller and the auction house negotiated with each other to decide the commission rules for their own advantage.

关 键 词：AUCTION commission proportion Bayesian equilibrium bidding strategy 

分 类 号：O29[理学—应用数学] F724.59[理学—数学]