N.哈特曼的价值柏拉图主义  

作　　者：董世峰[1] 

机构地区：[1]深圳大学学报编辑部,广东深圳518060

出　　处：《现代哲学》2006年第3期114-121,共8页Modern Philosophy

摘　　要：N.哈特曼的价值柏拉图主义是由价值本质论、关系论、发现论、理想论、原则论等观点构成的一个完整的理论范式。如果说在柏拉图的理念论中概念与理念处于一种杂合不分的混沌状态,休谟、叔本华等不满于此状态而试图对其作出明晰的区分,那么这些观点显示哈特曼既欲明晰鸿沟又要弥合鸿沟的理论创意。立基于价值柏拉图主义和价值绝对主义,又摆向价值自然主义和价值相对主义,显示了哈特曼价值论乃至整个价值柏拉图主义的理论困境及摆脱困境的理论努力。Nicolai Hartmann＇s value Platonism is a whole theory pattern, which is constituted of theory of value essence and relation and discovering and ideal and principle. This theory indicates theory originality that Hartman wants to distinguish and close the gulf between conception and idea, on the understanding that they were not differentiated in Plato＇s idea theory, Hume and Schopenhauer were discontent of this state and tried to distinguish them. Based on value Platonism and value absolutism, leaning to value naturalism and value relativism, which throwing out the theory corner and theory endeavor of breaking away from the corner of Hartmann＇s axiology and the whole value Platonism.

关 键 词：N.哈特曼 价值 理念 本质 柏拉图主义 

分 类 号：B018[哲学宗教—哲学理论]