控制权私有收益的实证分析  

Empirical Analysis on the Private Benefits of Control

作　　者：余明桂[1] 夏新平[1] 潘红波[1] 

机构地区：[1]华中科技大学管理学院,武汉430074

出　　处：《管理科学》2006年第3期27-33,共7页Journal of Management Science

基　　金：华中科技大学博士后研究基金

摘　　要：通过1998年-2004年间发生的54个非流通股协议转让事件估计中国上市公司的控制权私有收益，用两个指标来度量控制权私有收益，第一个指标是协议转让的每股价格相对于每股净资产的溢价，第二个指标是协议转让的溢价总值与企业净资产的比率。研究发现，买方为获得上市公司的控制权平均支付的每股溢价达45％，平均总溢价水平达17％。进一步对控制权私有收益的影响因素进行横截面分析发现。股权转让规模和交易完成后买方的持股比例越大控制权私有收益越高，业绩较差的企业的控制权私有收益反而较高，其他大股东和债权人可以在一定程度上制约控股股东攫取控制权私有收益。研究结果表明，掌握了企业控制权的大股东能够排他性地享有控制权私有收益。This paper estimates the private benefits of control exclusively enjoyed by controlling shareholder using 54 negotiated transfers of illiquid shares from 1998 - 2004 in Chinese listed companies. Two indexes are used to define the private benefits of control. The first index is the premium of negotiated transfer price per share to net assets per share. The second index is the total premium of negotiated transfer value to net assets of the firm. Empirical results show that the average premium and the total premium are 45% and 17% respectively. The cross-sectional analyses shows that the size of transferred equity and the percentage of the ownership held by the buyers are positively correlated to the private benefits of control. Firms with poorer performance have higher private benefits of control. Other blockholders and creditors may restrict the expropriation of minority shareholders to some extent. Above results suggest that the controlling shareholders may exclusively enjoy the private benefits of control.

关 键 词：控股股东 股权溢价 股权转让 控制权私有收益 

分 类 号：F276[经济管理—企业管理]