信息结构、风险偏好与盈余操纵行为——一次实验研究的结论  

Information Structure,Risk Preference and Earnings Manipulation Behavior-The Result of An Experimental Study

作　　者：姚宏[1] 李延喜[1] 高锐[1] 张晶晶[1] 

机构地区：[1]大连理工大学管理学院,116024

出　　处：《会计研究》2006年第5期58-65,共8页Accounting Research

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(项目号:70302008);霍英东教育基金会高等院校青年教师基金(基金号:101084)资助

摘　　要：运用实验方法构建具有不同信息结构的市场环境,研究风险偏好与外部监管环境对盈余操纵行为的影响。实验结果表明,外部监管环境对盈余操纵行为具有显著约束作用;信息不对称时,信息成本将加重操纵程度,内幕交易者借助信息优势,或者回避风险,或者获取超额收益;非内幕交易者存在过度自信表现;信息结构不影响风险偏好者的操纵意愿。但与外部惩戒力共同影响其最终收益。the impact of risk preference and external supervising on earnings manipulation behavior.The results indicate that external supervising has a restriction effect on earnings manipulation behavior remarkably:external supervising coefficient,the combination of punishment co- efficient and spot test probability,has an integrative effect,which is higher than the effect respectively;Under the conditions of infor- mation asymmetry,information obtained by the insiders can be diffused through the market.Relied on information superiority,the insid- ers can avoid risks and acquire surplus earnings;Non-insiders have overconfident performance;Information structures don't affect manip- ulation wills of the person with the risk preference,but have a conjunct influence on the ultimate earnings with the external supervising.

关 键 词：盈余管理 信息结构 风险偏好 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理]