上市公司“隧道行为”及其治理  

The Corporate Governance of Listed Companies′Tunneling Behavior

作　　者：陈伟民[1] 

机构地区：[1]南京邮电大学管理工程系,江苏南京210003

出　　处：《商业研究》2006年第14期81-83,共3页Commercial Research

摘　　要：公司资产和利润被转移到其控制性股东手中的“隧道行为”普遍存在,在我国资本市场上,由于特殊的制度背景,这种控制性股东剥夺中小股东利益的现象表现得更为突出。治理我国上市公司“隧道行为”应依靠一套严密的规则,包括以立法和政府管制为主导的关联交易的监管;充分和严格的信息披露;尊重独立董事的意见和建立股东派生诉讼制度等。＂Tunneling＂ is introduced to describe the phenomenon that controlling shareholders embezzle the resources of their companies. In Chinese capital market there exist more problems that controlling shareholders deprive minor shareholders of their interest owing to this special system. The governance of tunneling behavior in Chinese listed companies need rely on a close set of rules, including legislation and governmental control on the correlation transactions, strict information disclosune system, resoect for indeoendent director and derivative action system, etc.

关 键 词：控股股东 隧道行为 治理 

分 类 号：F276.6[经济管理—企业管理]