现金流权比例对终级股东剥夺行为的约束程度分析  

On the Role of the Proportion of Cash Flow Ownership in Limiting the Expropriation by Controlling Shareholders

作　　者：葛敬东[1] 

机构地区：[1]广东商学院会计学院,510320

出　　处：《会计研究》2006年第7期52-58,共7页Accounting Research

摘　　要：在投资者保护理论中,已有数位中外学者研究过现金流权比例对终极股东剥夺约束的问题,但由于他们建立的函数模型均以终极股东“不出售股票”的假设为前提,因而限定了模型的普遍适用性。本文将在修正和扩展现有学者的研究假设之下,建立关于终极股东“出售股票”前提下的收入函数,并进一步探寻在股票价格和控制权的作用下现金流权对于限制剥夺的临界比例数值,以更进一步清晰地度量终极股东持有的现金流权比例对于其剥夺的约束程度,为外部股东防范被剥夺提供预警信息。Some s1cholars at home and abroad have researched that the proportion of cash flow ownership by controlling shareholders can limit them to exploit minority shareholders,but their hypotheses in theory are far from the fact,viz.controlling shareholders do not sell their stocks,the ex- ploitations by controlling shareholders are determined by their income.In fact,the exploitations by Controlling Shareholders are not only deter- mined by their income,but also by their whole benefits from stock market.So their hypotheses by scholars must be extended.This paper dis- cusses the whole benefits function of controlling shareholders in stock market,by which determine the critical point of proportion of cash flow ownership by controlling shareholders that can describe correctly their exploitations,so that provide an alert for out-side shareholders.

关 键 词：终极股东 收入函数 现金流权比例 剥夺临界值 实现控制权的最小比例 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理]