关于研发机构非显著工艺创新的最优许可研究  

ON LICENSING OF NON-DRASTIC COST-RDEUCING INNOVATION BY A RESEARCH UNIT

作　　者：郭红珍[1] 张毅[1] 黄文杰[1] 

机构地区：[1]华北电力大学工商管理学院,北京102206

出　　处：《经济数学》2006年第2期170-180,共11页Journal of Quantitative Economics

摘　　要：研发机构创新成功后,应该重视知识资产的主动管理,在专利许可谈判中科学合理地确定专利许可策略,以追求收益最大化.本文的目的是进一步完善与具体化Kamien,Tauman与Oren(1992)的模型,深入研究研发机构在不同许可机制下对在位厂商的非显著创新许可收益,以及最优许可策略选择.主要结论是:给定厂商数量,当创新规模较小时,研发机构的最优策略为提成许可,其次是不限许可数量的F(F)许可与一级价格密封投标拍卖许可;当创新规模较大时,研发机构的最优策略为拍卖许可,提成许可次之,最后是不限许可数量的F(F)许可.Consider an upstream research unit that has devlopde and patentde a marketable innovation seeks to hcense the innovation to a pool of downstream potential licensees so to maximize its total revenues. In the context of Cournot quantity Competition equilibrium in the product market, this paper which improving Kamien, Tauman and Oren（1992） studies the licensing of non-drastic cost-reducing innovation by means of three possible allocation mechanism： fixed-fee without licensing number restriction, royalty, and a first price sealed bid auction. Optimal licensing strategy of the research unit is examined. We get different result from KOT（1992）. The main result of this paper is ： given the number of downstream firms, on the viewpoint of research unit, royalty licensing strategy is optimal for small innovation size, and auction licensing strategy is optimal for large innovation size.

关 键 词：研发机构 专利许可 固定费用 提成 拍卖 

分 类 号：F273.1[经济管理—企业管理]