贷款人监督的缺失与目标公司治理的改善——来自沪、深两市交易所的相关证据  

Deficiency of Lender Oversight and the Corporate Governance of Listed Companies

作　　者：陈小怡[1] 何建敏[1] 

机构地区：[1]东南大学经济管理学院,江苏南京210096

出　　处：《金融研究》2006年第8期70-78,共9页Journal of Financial Research

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(项目号:70371035)资助。

摘　　要：本文从公司利益相关方——银行作为贷款人对于改善上市公司治理的推进作用方面做出探讨,认为银行作为专业金融机构其专业技能和在贷款合同中基于贷款人的主导地位有利于实施对公司的监督,对于改善公司治理具有重要意义。本文分析了2002-2005年沪深两市交易所发布的谴责公告中上市公司贷款及担保信息未披露的相关数据,探析了银行对借款人监督的缺失以及由此造成的负面影响,提出了银行应从借款人决策程序要求、信息披露要求等方面制定规则来强化贷款人的监督、检查,从而改善中国上市公司治理的建议。From the perspective of stakeholder, the paper mainly studies how can banks as lenders exert better governance on corporations. Based on the analysis of the data related to the condemnation of listed corporations＇ undisclosed loan and guarantee information issued by the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges from 2002 to 2005, the paper discuss the deficiency of banking supervision for borrowers and its negative effects. Finally, considering the requirements for loan policy, procedure, and information disclosure, etc. , the author suggests that banks should formulate regulations to strengthen their oversight capabilities; thereby improving the governance of China＇s listed corporations.

关 键 词：贷款人监督 利益相关者 决策程序 信息披露 公司治理 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理] F832.51[经济管理—国民经济]