管理者收购、企业家职能与上市公司治理结构  

MBO,Entrepreneurship and Corporate Governance of Listed Company

作　　者：张凤香[1] 姚传江[2] 

机构地区：[1]南开大学国际商学院,天津300071 [2]东北财经大学经济学院,黑龙江哈尔滨116025

出　　处：《华东经济管理》2006年第8期29-32,共4页East China Economic Management

基　　金：教育部哲学社会科学重大攻关项目(03JZD0018)资助

摘　　要：管理者收购的主要目的是解决“代理人问题”,企业藉此能够建立一种努力与收益相对称的、以股权为基础的激励机制。文章首先分析了MBO与企业家职能的关系,认为MBO是对所有权与经营权合一的回归;其次对MBO与公司治理结构进行了分析,认为MBO是求解所有权与经营权以及约束与激励之间的最佳平衡点,其结果是治理结构的调整和利益分配的改变,而MBO与企业经营绩效提高之间并不存在必然的正相关关系;最后文章透析了近年来中国上市公司的MBO,指出对于非国有控股上市公司而言,MBO的意义在于通过经营者持股解决从家族式企业向现代企业过渡的二次创业问题;对于国有控股上市公司而言,目前应充分关注具有控制权的管理者以较低价格收购公司股权,造成国有资产流失。The main purpose of M130 is to solve the principal-agent problem and help the related company to develop an effective incentive mechanism. The first part of this thesis gives an analysis on the relationship between MBO and entrepreneurship and holds the point that MBO is a kind of return to the integration of ownership and management. The second part is about MBO and corporate governance and believes that MBO is an optimal balance point not only for ownership and management but also for supervision and incentive. The result of MBO is to cause the adjustment of corporate governance and the redistribution of income. And it also shows that there is no causally positive correlation. MBO and the company performance. Finally, the thesis covers the recent MBO events of China＇s listed companies, and points out that for the non-SOEs, MBO could significantly contribute to the transition from Family Company to Modem Firm System, and for the SOEs, much attention should be paid to phenomenon that the manager of absolute majority share may buy the company at a lower price, causing the losses of the national asset.

关 键 词：管理者收购 企业家职能 公司治理 

分 类 号：F276.6[经济管理—企业管理]