论公司僵局纠纷的司法救济  

On the Judicial Assistance of the Corporation Deadlock

作　　者：孙晓英[1] 

机构地区：[1]郑州大学法学院,河南郑州450001

出　　处：《河南商业高等专科学校学报》2006年第4期81-84,共4页Journal of Hennan Business College

摘　　要：期待利益落空理论和公司社会责任理论是公司僵局司法救济的理论基础。公司僵局纠纷的司法救济途径有司法强制解散和强制股权置换等。我国修改后的《公司法》只规定了司法强制解散公司制度,在原告、被告的适格问题,起诉的前提条件,将调解设置为必经程序,一并处理善后事宜等方面均有探讨的必要,同时操作性也不强。应通过司法解释的方法,完善相关规定,切实保护当事人的利益。Frustration of purpose and social responsibility is the theoretical foundation of judicial assistance of corporation deadlock. The dispute of corporation deadlock can be resolved through the judicial assistance such as the involuntary judicial dissolution, involuntary stock deal and so on . The revised corporation law of China only stipulates the system of involuntary judicial dissolution, and it does not use well. The related rules should be perfected though judicial interpretation to protect the party＇s interest really.

关 键 词：公司僵局 理论基础 司法救济 

分 类 号：D925.3[政治法律—诉讼法学]