东亚区域合作机制:促进中日合作的机制设计  

To solve Sino-Japanese‘dilemma': East Asian economic cooperation

作　　者：范洪颖[1] 王首中[2] 

机构地区：[1]广东外语外贸大学法学院,广东广州510420 [2]辽宁大学国际关系学院,辽宁沈阳110036

出　　处：《广州大学学报（社会科学版）》2006年第7期13-16,共4页Journal of Guangzhou University:Social Science Edition

摘　　要：中日之间存在着难以化解的历史问题、现实矛盾与冲突以及未来合作的隐患。这些障碍使两国关系陷入了类似“囚徒困境”博弈的难题。然而,中日在经济上的相互依存关系为双方突破“囚徒困境”奠定了坚实基础。中日实现和解的途径必须是在一定制度模式下进行无限次重复博弈。在多次博弈中,为了获取长期而更大的利益,双方有可能放弃眼前利益而采取合作策略。东亚区域合作机制的构建,为中日进行无限次博弈提供了现实支持。两国在区域合作中有可能逐渐增强共识和理解,走出“囚徒困境”。There exist inextricable historical problems, current conflicts and hidden troubles between China and Japan. All these have plunged Sino-Japanese relationship into a game of ＂prisoners＇ dilemma＂. However, economic inter-dependence lays a foundation for the two countries to solve the ＂prisoners＇ dilemma＂. The way to reconcile the dilemma is to play infinitely repeated games under some institutional pattern, in which the two sides may possibly give up the present interests to adopt a cooperative policy for more benefits in the future. The establishment of cooperation mechanism in East Asia serves as support for China and Japan to play infinite games. The two countries are possible to exert self-restraint and enhance consensus and understanding, and finally come out of the ＂prisoners＇ dilemma＂ in East Asian economic cooperation.

关 键 词：囚徒困境 中日合作 东亚区域合作 无限次重复博弈 

分 类 号：D815[政治法律—国际关系]