企业年金中的委托-代理风险研究  

On the Principal-agent Problem in the Enterprise Pension System

作　　者：黄瑞[1] 

机构地区：[1]华中科技大学经济学院,湖北武汉430074

出　　处：《北京航空航天大学学报（社会科学版）》2006年第3期24-27,共4页Journal of Beijing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics：Social Sciences edition Edition

摘　　要：企业年金涉及雇员、雇主、账户管理人、投资管理人等多方的利益。文章分析了在不同的管理模式下,企业年金各方所形成的双层委托-代理关系,剖析了企业年金委托-代理风险形成的原因,在此基础之上,提出了应对企业年金委托-代理风险的对策。The enterprise pension involves several interested parties, such as employees, eoployers, treasurers and investment managers .The parties concerned are in continualcontract with one another, and thus form princlpal-agent relationships. This article focuses on the principal-agent problem in the enterprise pension system. Based on an analysis if the underlying cause of the problems the article puts forward the strategies of coping with it.

关 键 词：企业年金 委托-代理问题 激励机制 约束机制 

分 类 号：F840.67[经济管理—保险]